While visiting Baku on Aug. 8, Russian President Vladimir Putin said he wanted a solution to the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict where there would be no loser and no winner. Unfortunately, such a “nobody loses and nobody wins” solution where both sides benefit is an absolute impossibility. That is said without equivocation. How can any solution based on the Madrid Proposals result in a solution that will benefit both sides? The Proposals have been known for years to favor Azerbaijan’s claim of territorial integrity against Karabagh’s (Artsakh) right to independence.
To that end, the countries represented by the Minsk Group co-chairs have been obsessive in supporting the principle of territorial integrity against the inalienable right of self-determination. Even our Russian ally has not been forthright in support of Artsakh’s position, but continues to play both sides against the middle. The Minsk Group Co-chairs by failing to respond to Azerbaijan’s egregious violations along the Line of Contact (LoC) have effectively granted Azerbaijan carte blanche to maintain, without fear of repercussions, a belligerent policy vis-a-vis Artsakh and Armenia. Other than their vacuous comments advising both sides to refrain from increasing tensions along the LoC, the co-chairs have never called Azerbaijan to account for its incessant border violations; its refusals to allow observers to visit certain sectors along the LoC; for the verified atrocities committed by Azeri soldiers; for occupying Artsakh territory seized during the April war, or for their four-day full-scale military offensive in April against Artsakh.
We seem to ignore the fact that the countries represented by the Minsk Group co-chairs have never recognized Artsakh’s declaration of independence or that the pro-Azeri Madrid Proposals do not provide for the de jure recognition of Nagorno-Karabagh. Why should any solution be predicated on the requirement that we evacuate the liberated territories and demobilize the Artsakh Defense Force before a promise that at some indefinite time in the future Artsakh’s status will be determined? These requirements are the death knell for Artsakh’s independence.
It is far too late in the process for us to rail against the Madrid Proposals or the pro-Azeri bias of those who mediate the negotiation process. To use the vernacular, this has been known to us from the get go. It is what it is.
Contrary to what President Putin has suggested, there will be a winner and there will be a loser. How can the principle of territorial integrity to satisfy Azerbaijan be reconciled with the principle of self-determination to satisfy Artsakh’s right to be independent? If anyone can solve this conundrum, please speak up.
It is time that we focus on what our response will be when a solution to bring peace to the south Caucasus calls for restoring the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and reestablishing the Nagorno-Karabagh exclave where Armenians will be granted cultural autonomy under the guise of self-determination? This is the type of agreement that satisfies President Putin’s hypocritical expectation of a solution with no winners and no losers and with benefits for both sides. It is the type of agreement that the pro-Azeri bloc would readily endorse. This is the unfortunate reality of our situation. Ignoring it does not make it go away. It is amazing how we seem to take comfort from the comments of visiting foreign dignitaries who support the importance of a negotiated settlement for Artsakh. Who would disagree with that? Yet these same foreign dignitaries do not support Artsakh’s right to independence or our claim to Kashatagh and Shahumian.
Faced with this harsh reality, our people have a serious decision to make. Either we accept an agreement which not only ignores the will of the Karabagh Armenians and the legitimate economic, political, and security interests of Armenia, or we reject it. That may be criticized as bold talk and rightly so. However, the prospect of cultural autonomy under Azeri jurisdiction is not why some 7,000 azatmartiks (freedom fighters) gave their lives to secure independence. And it is not why our soldiers, manning fortifications along the LoC since 1994, have given their lives to protect Artsakh.
Any agreement to be acceptable must effectively address the security needs of Armenia and Artsakh. The inclusion of Shahumian and Kashatagh is an absolute necessity. This physically unites Armenia and Artsakh and places the Vardenis-Martakert Road and the Lachin Corridor Road within Armenian territory. Air flights from Armenia to Stepanakert International Airport would navigate only Armenian air space.
Lest we forget, reclaiming Artsakh would just be the beginning for Azerbaijan and its Turkish ally. A seriously weakened Armenia would only increase their determination to eventually demand the Syunak District (Zankezour) that would effectively isolate Armenia from Iran and provide a corridor by way of Nakhichevan connecting Turkey with Azerbaijan proper. Having lost our defendable borders, Armenia would be dismembered by our implacable enemies, piece by piece.
Contrary to what President Putin has suggested, there will be a winner and there will be a loser. How can the principle of territorial integrity to satisfy Azerbaijan be reconciled with the principle of self-determination to satisfy Artsakh’s right to be independent? If anyone can solve this conundrum, please speak up.
There are bargaining chips that can lead to a compromise solution. These include the Azeri occupied areas of northern Shahumian and the border regions of Martakert and Martuni from which Armenians were forced to leave, southeastern Artsakh and Agdam, as well as other issues such as the right of return, sharing water resources, compensation, etc. That agenda is for Artsakh and Armenia to determine.
A solution that does not address our legitimate security interests will condemn Armenia to economic and political subservience within the south Caucasus. And any agreement that proposes open borders is worth very little, contrary to what many Armenians may think. With an open border it will only be a matter of time before the Turkish economy, which generates more than an $800 billion Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would absorb Armenia’s economy of $11 billion GDP. How long after that before the Turkish Lira would replace the Armenian Dram? Does anyone expect that the xenophobic leaders of Georgia will be more accommodating with respect to Armenia’s interests as they are drawn more tightly into the Turkish-Azeri economic and political web. We can envision Georgia accelerating its depopulation of Javakhk. If conditions in Armenian are considered dire today, can there be a realistic expectation that conditions would get better? We can easily foresee emigration from Armenia accelerating and its population decreasing even further as more individuals and families leave in search of a better life.
Our struggle is not one just for land, but for the survival of our nation. Artsakh is an indispensable part of a future Armenia. Have we survived the genocide that came close to annihilating our nation to have doubts about what is at stake today and our ability to respond? A century has passed and our enemies remain the same. Time has not changed their determination to destroy us. Whatever decision our brothers and sisters in the Homeland (Armenia and Artsakh) may make, our duty in the Diaspora is to provide them with our fullest support.
We cannot allow fear of renewed hostilities to force us to accept a solution that condemns us to political servitude. Should Azerbaijan opt to reignite the conflict, they run the risk of stirring-up the latent nationalistic passions on either side of the Caucasus as well as on either side of the Caspian Sea. With wars raging in Syria and Iraq, a highly unstable Afghanistan; a seriously deteriorated situation in Turkey and Europe still concerned with the potential for more people fleeing the war zones or seeking economic opportunity no government, pro-Azeri or not, would condone a protracted war whose unintended consequences could easily be more than any of them may envision. That fact alone is a deterrent. However, if cooler heads do not prevail in Baku, the Azeri military may decide to gamble on their ability to penetrate key sectors of Artsakh’s defenses in a bid to occupy a commanding bargaining position. The Azeri know that they do not have an open-ended time schedule, but can count on a 72-hour window of opportunity before pressure mounts for a ceasefire. Having said that, it is obvious that there can be no April surprises.
Let us keep in mind that any solution, once the hammer falls, will favor Azerbaijan (and its Turkish ally). This is not based on clairvoyance, but on the pro-Azeri bias of the Madrid Proposals and the countries represented by the Minsk-Group co-chairs. To accept a solution that ignores our legitimate political, economic, and security interests would be more devastating to the hopes and dreams we had for a greater Armenia then any consequences should we refuse.
Source: Armenian Weekly
Link: Have We Considered Our Response to a Pro-Azeri Solution?